THE OVERSEAS REFUGEE PROGRAM:

I

FOREIGN POLICY, PUBLIC OPINION, AND REFUGEE POLICY

i

Refugee. A person who is outside hisher country and is unable or
unwilling to return to that country because of a well-founded fear that
shehe will be persecuted because of race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.'

I

1

I

1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; 8 U.S.C. 5 1lOI(a)(42) (1988).
This defdtion excludes persons displaced by natural disasters or persons commonly known as "economic
migrants," whose primary reason for flight has been a desire for personal betterment rather than persecution
per se.
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INTRODUCTION
Since World War 11, more refugees found permanent homes in the United States
~ than 1.7 million have been admitted since 1980.) The
than in any other c o ~ n t r y .More
current estimated world refugee population is 14 million, with millions of others
internally displaced within their own countries by war, famine, and civil unrest.4 As the
media focuses more on international unrest and the numbers of rehgees increase,
Americans are more aware of the problem.5 Immigration issues are frequently at the
forefront of public debate, and politicians are taking note.6 Immigration law in general as
well as statutory provisions governing the admissions of refugees into the United States
reflect this awareness.
Usually refugees are thought of as among the world's most unfortunate. In
addition to being a victim of persecution, a refugee has also been uprooted, forced to
leave familiar territory because of his or her oppression. However, under modern
international law, to be a "recognized" refugee is also to assume a position of privilege.
Refugees unlike millions of other deprived people throughout the world benefit fiom
distinctive programs for relief and assistance, and often fiom resettlement in other

Bureau of Population, Refirgees and Migrarion, US.Refirgee Admissions Program (Feb. 1997)
~http://www.state.gov/wwwlglobaVpdfs-re~gee-a~-9702.
htmb.
16.
4

Id The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that the number of refugees
worldwide in 1997 exceeded 16 million individuals. This estimate may be low because the estimate was
already f 4 million in 1988. U.S.Committee for Refugees, World Refirgee Survey: 1988 in Review 32-33
(1989). More exact numbers are unknown because of inadequate global registration procedures, and
because persons living outside of actual refugee camps or centers are not oficially considered refugees for
statistical purposes. 8 U.S.C.5 1101(a)(42).
5
Stephen H.Legomsky, The Making of UnitedStates Refugee Policy: Separation in the Post-Cold War
Era, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 675,675 (1995).
6
California laws regarding bilingual education and status of undocumented children in schools, for
example.

countries.' Paradoxically this "privileged" position makes the designation of refugee a
sought after designation which comes with political implications.
Many people who fear persecution seek entry as refugees into the United States.
They flee their homes in times of trauma,often in fear for their lives, when home
countries cannot or will not provide protection.8 An alien's successful claim that helshe
is subject to persecution may lead to permanent residence in the United States through
two very different paths. Each path has it own distinctive set of procedures, constraints,
and legal and policy dilemmas.
A path taken by some is to apply for political asylum at a port of entry, such as an

airport, seaport, or border or to enter the United States, legally or illegally, and then seek

asylum.9 People entering the United States in these situations are called asylees if asylum
is @anted.''
Others flee across international borders into countries other than the United
States. When these countries of first refuge are unwilling or unable to provide permanent
help, a third country must step forward to provide assistance or possible resettlement. The
United States established a system to oversee the recognition, admission and permanent
resettlement in the United States of some overseas refugees. This system is referred to as
the Overseas Refugee Program, which is the focus of this paper.11
The legal basis of the United States refugee admissions program is the Refugee

7

Thomas Alexander Aieinikoff & David A. Martin, Immigration Process and Policy 7 17 (199 1).
8 U.S.C. 5 1 IOl(a)(42) (current definition of refugee under current U.S. law).
This is done in one of two ways. Some affirmatively seek asylum within one year of entry. MA tj
208(a)(2)@), 8 U.S.C.A. tj I 158 (1998). Others seek asylum defensively; they apply for asylum aRer
removal proceedings have begun. Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 765 (citing 8 C.F.R.5 208.2@) (1998)).
'O This type of asylum is discretionary on the part of the Attorney General of the United States. MA 5
208(b)(l), 8 U.S.C.A. 5 1158.
" Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212 (1980), amending INA 5 207,8 U.S.C. 1157 (1998).
4

Act of 1980.'~Prior to the passage of this act, the United States admitted refbgees on a
case-by-casebasis through the political process. The Rehgee Act was meant to remove

the political and ideological basis for determining refbgee status and to make the process
neutral, there by conforming to international law, i-e., Art. I, 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees, I.N.A. 8 208(a), 8 U.S.C. $ 1 101(a)(42) (1988).13
In spite of this effart, consecutive administrations have used refugee policy
primarily as a foreign policy tool to discredit foreign policy adversaries. This practice
ofien causes political migrations, or "refugee flows," which impact American
communities and influence public opinion regarding the continued admission of refugees
into the United states.14 Ultimately, these factors become embodied into policy.15
In seeking lasting solutions for refugees, the United States and the United
Nations Higb Commissioner for Refugees give highest priority to the safe, voluntary
return of refugees to their homelands. If asylum in the country of first refuge is not
feasible, resettlement in third countries - including the United States - is considered for

refugees in urgent need of protection. The United States considers for refigee admission
persons coming from areas designated by the executive branch as areas of "special
humanitarian concern" who can establish persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, reIigion, nationality, membership in a particular social

id.
INSv. Cordoza-Fonscca,480 U.S.421 (1987). The United States is a signatory to the 1967 hotocol
relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S.267.
14
Congress passed laws explicitly linking refugee status with politicaI ideology. Since World War 11, the
United States has been an active participant in the effort to assist refugees fleeing persecution, however, the
appeals that are most frequently heeded are those that advance American political objectives. Granting
refugee status for the purpose of discrediting adversarial governments was standard practice during the
Cold War, however, politically motivated refugee movements have a more far-reaching effect than simply
discrediting adversary governments.
IS
TahI Tyson, The Refugee Act of 1980: Suggested Reforms in the Overseas Program to Safeguard
Humanitarian Concernsfiom Compering Interests, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 92 1,922 (1 990).
l2

l3

group, or political opinion.
Crucial to the operation of both the overseas rehgee programs and the politicat
asylum adjudication system is the statutory definition of refugee. Section 10l (a)(42)(A)
of the WA defines a "refugee" as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country
in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion . . . i 6

Although many may qualify as refugees under the Rehgee Act's definition,
fi-u-ther distinctions are necessary in order to have a manageable number that can be
resettIed in the United states.17 However, the criteria for these distinctions are often
based on political decisions which may preclude those who might meet the statutory
definition of "refugee" in INA 8 101(a)(42) from being eligible to migrate to the United
States.
Allowing foreign policy goals to supercede humanitarian concerns in the refugee
admission process encourages arbitrary results. Furthermore, it violates the spirit of
neutrality set forth in the United Nations ~ m ~ o c o lIn
. ' ~addition, it has severe

consequences for those who would otherwise gain admittance to the United

The

conflict between humanitarian and political goals has resulted in a discriminatory rehgee
policy in which political interests define and supercede human rights.21
-

16

8 U.S.C. § I101(a)(42) (in addition to the U.N.definition, refbgees must come from areas of the world
designated of "special humanitarian concern" as determined by the president on an annual basis.
l7 Tyson,supra note 15, at 921.
LB
AleinikoE, supra note 7, at 739.
l9 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S.
267,
20
Tyson,supra note 15, at 92 1.
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6

This paper first examines the history of American refugee policy and the origins
of the Overseas Refugee Program. An overview of the structure of the program follows,
with an example of how it was applied to Iraqi refugees after the Gulf War. Then, I will

present the key influences afFecting the United States refugee policy: humanitarian
concerns, domestic concerns including special interest groups and public opinion, and
foreign policy. Next I will present a critique of the current-politically motivated system.
Finally, I propose suggested reforms including the establishment of an independent board
to make annual determinations regarding refugee admissions; or giving federal courts the
authority to determine grant rehgee status based on the general condition of the
originating country and the particular circumstances of the refugee, or allowing the
executive to maintain its authority to determine refhgee policy, but to rely less on foreign
policy criteria to make its determinations and more on humanitztrian concerns.

I. HISTORY OF THE OVERSEAS REFUGEE PROGRAM
HistoricaIly, the United States admitted refugees through an ad-hoc decision
making process which reflected more interest in politics than humanitarian concerns.
Only with the end of World War IT was there much attention in the United States to
refugee programs. Many gave preference to refugees from communist countries. Early
statutes were explicit in this regard. For example, after World War 11 President Truman
ordered priority use of regular immigration quota numbers for the admission of some of

the millions of displaced person left stranded in Europe. Congress then passed the first
significant refugee legislation in American history in order to address the same problem.

The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 was aimed at Eastern ~ u r o ~ e a n This
s . ~ Act
~
provided a temporary program for the admission of 400,000 people primarily from
communist or communist-dominated regions. The Act also incorporated cut-off dates

which required those who applied for visas to show that they entered Allied zones on or
before December 22,1945. This arbitrary cut-off date had the effect of denying the
benefit of the Act to a great number of Jews who had fled the Soviet Union or Poland. 23

Four years later, the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act recognized only those
refugees who, because of "persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion
or political opinion ... have fled from any Communist-dominated country or area, or
from any country within the general area of the Middle East ... or persons uprooted by
catastrophic natural calamity as defined by the

resident."^^

Refugees under the Act

were admitted on a conditional basis. This meant that refugees remained constructively
at the border and were subject to exclusion rather than deportation proceedings if the
government chose to do so. This procedure was almost identical to parole.2s
No comprehensive legislation promulgated in the 1940's and 1950's provided

general authority to admit refugees. It became increasingly common for the Attorneys
General to use their powers under INA 5 2 12(d)(5) to "parole" groups of refugees based
on political concerns instead of

individual^.^^ Examples include Hungarians who fled

One third of the admissions under the Act were Polish. Western Hemisphere Immigration and United
States Foreign Policy 196 (Christopher Mitchell ed. 1991) (citation omitted).
23 Kathetyn Bockley, A Historical Oveview of Refugee Legislation: The Deception ofForeign Policy in the
Land of Promise, 21 N.C.J . Int'l L. & Corn. Reg. 253 (1995)
~d.
25 Davalene Cooper, Promised Land or Broken Promises? Political Asylum in the UnifedState.,76 K y .
L.J.943,946 (198711988) (citation omitted). The statute provides in relevant part: "The term 'refhgeeescapee' means any alien who, because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or
olitical opinion has Red or shall flee (A) from any communist-occupied area." 8 U.S.C. § 1 153(a)(7).
8 U.S.C.A. 5 1 1112. LegomsQ, supra note 5, at 830. Parole power was initially intended as a
mechanism to provide temporary relief to individuals, or to provided a means whereby persons unable to fit
8

"

'

their country after the Soviet Union crushed the 1956 revolution and Cubans who left
their country after C ~ t r seized
o
power in 1959." From the executive branch's
standpoint parole power was exceedingly convenient because it allowed for a flexible
response to developing crises, without the need for new legislation? However, from the
standpoint of the refugee, no meaningful qualification criteria existed, and there was

virtually no procedural protection when a request for parole was turned down.29 In
addition, once admitted into the United States, there was no direct way for rehgees to
adjust status, even though the intention of the Hungarian and Cuban programs were to
bring refugees to the United States on a permanent basis.30 From Congress's point of
view, the practice of mass parole precluded legislative input into national policy

decisions that had ,sweepingdomestic and international

effect^.^'

The 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act marked a dramatic
transition in U.S. refugee

Congress revamped the entire system of quotas and

preferences, equalizing immigration opportunities for people of every nation.33 The
Amendments gave priority to f m i l y members of U.S. residents and immigrants with
needed

The new legislation codified the geopolitical definition of refugee which

had emerged in response to the Cold War and contained a clear ideological bias.
Congress gave special status to those fleeing communist-dominated countries. 35
the narrow refugee defmition could be admitted temporarily. However, i t ultimately became a numerically
significant component of the nation's legal immigration system.
Id.
Aleinkoff, supra note 7,737 ( 1 99 1 ).
29 Legomsky,supra note 5 , at.830.
30 Congress eventually cured this problem by special statutes authorizing adjustment o f status for
Hungarians and Cubans. A leinikoff, supra note 7, at 737
31 ld.
32 Bockley, supra note 23, at 270.
33 Id

"

3d

Id.

However, the most important change was the creation of a "seventh preference"36for
diens who feared persecution and were fleeing either a "Communist dominated" country
or a country "within the general area of the Middle ~ast.'"' This seventh preference
provision was often called "conditional entry," because its beneficiaries did not come in

as immigrants, but were classified as "conditional entrants."38However, the f 965 law
provided for fairly routine adjustment out of conditional entrant status to permanent
resident status two years after initial arrival. 39
The 1965 Amendments were seen as an attempt to limit parole power, but they

were largely unsuccessfi~l.~~
Parole authority continued to be used by the executive
branch to supplement existing channels of admi~sion.~'
With increased refugee flows in
the 1960's and 19707s,the 1965 solution proved inadequate.42 The ceilings on numbers

of refugees allowed into the United States were unrealistically low relative to the
increasing number of refugees. Of particular concern were the huge numbers of refugees
horn Indochina during the 1970's. Despite public outcry and congressional concern, the
executive branch continued to use paroIe power to admit large groups of refugees.43
Parole authority became increasingly controversial, reinforcing the sense that an orderly
36

In 1952,the McCarran-Walter bill passed into law as the immigration andNationality Act over the veto
of President Truman. The Act consolidated previous immigration laws into one statute, but preserved the
national origins quota system. The Act also established a system of preferences for skilled workers and
relatives of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens. It also tightened security and screening
procedures. The Act established a 150,000numerical limitation on immigration from the Eastern
Hemisphere; most Western hemisphere immigration remained unrestricted, although it established a subquota for immigrants born in the coionies or dependent areas of the Western Hemisphere. Finally the Act
repealed Japanese exclusion and established a small quota for the Asia-Pacific Triangle under which
Orientals would be charged. See Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 55.
37 F'ub. L. 89-236, 5 3,79 Stat. 91 1,913 (Oct. 3, 1965).
38
Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 738
39 Id.
Bockley, supra note 23, at 27 1.
4 1 Id.
42 Due to events in Ethiopia, the Indian-Pakistani War of 1971, expuision of thousands of Asians by
President Idi Amin in Uganda and Soviet Jews receiving exit permits in large numbers.

admissions process was needed.
Shocked by the realization that the Indochinese parole admission amounted to
almost two hundred thousand, Congress began a series of hearings on the admission of
refugees into the United

Representative Joshua Eiiberg, Chairman of the House

Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the Committee on

the Judiciary, pointed out that the vast majority of refitgees who entered the United States

did so at the discretion of the executive branch and not through regular refugee
provisions, i.e. the seventh preference provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1965." Eilberg subsequently submitted a bill that limited parole power, but it never
reached the House f l ~ o r . "However,
~
Congress became even more committed to
establishing consistent refugee policy. In March 1979, the Carter administration

submitted a bill, which was introduced in the Senate by Separor Edward M. Kennedy and
in the House of Representatives by Peter Rodino and Elizabeth Holtzman. A year later,
President Carter signed the Refigee Act of 1980.~'
While the U.S. government struggled with domestic legislation in regard to the
refugee issue, the United Nations established the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1949. In 195 1, the United Nations adopted the
Convention relating to the status of Refugees to deal specifically with the plight of
millions of refugees exiled within Europe after World War 11.~' This document limited
refugee status to those persons displaced during World War I1 and focused on a more
43

Legomsky,supra note 5, at 83 1.
Norman L. Zucker & Naomi Flink Zucker,The Gumded Gate 46 (1 987).
45 Id
46 Id Eilberg had lost his congressional seat following a scandal.
47 Refbgee Act of 1980, Pub. L.No. 96-212, amending I N A
207,8 U.S.C. 5 I 157.
48 Richard A.C.Cort, The Resettlement ofRefugees: National or International Duty?, Tex ht'l L.J. 307,
3 13 (1997). The United States was not a signatory to the 195 I Convention.

humanitarian approach to the assistance of refugees. 49 According to this document a
refugee is:

A person who is outside hisher country and is unable or unwilling to
return to that country because of a well-founded fear that shehe will be
persecuted because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group.50
Another important provision of the 195 1 Convention was non-refoulement - a
technical term deriving fiom Article 33 of the Convention which provides that receiving

states cannot expel or return "a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontier
territories where his life or fieedom wouId be threatened OII account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion."5' However, as
comprehensive as this protection may seem, it is limited and country-specific. The
receiving country is free to send a refbgee on to other countries, rather than granting
asylum on its soilas2Ironically, the United States was not a signatory to this document. In
its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, the international community
(UNHCR) expanded the definition of refugee to include those suffering from persecution

unrelated to the Second World warms3However, the basic requirement of a well-founded

fear of persecution remained at the core of the definition.54

In 1968, responding to international pressure, the United States signed and ratified
the United Nations Protocol Relating to the status of Refugees, thereby binding itself to

Bocktey, supra note 23, at 260.
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, arc. 1,189 U.N.T.S. 137; 8 U.S.C.5 110I(a)(42).
This definition excludes persons displaced by natural disasters or persons commonly known as "economic
migrants," whose primary reason for flight has been a desire for personal betterment rather than persecution
49

"Lr*.,

svprct note 47, st 3 13.
AIeinikoff, s u p note 7, at 732.
53 Bockley, supra note 23, at 260.
54
195 1 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; 8 U.S.C.A. 5 1 10 1(a)(42).
52

the substantive provisions of the 1951

on vent ion.^'

The President and Congress

believed that this ratification, combined with domestic legislation, prepared the United

States to carry out its Protocol obligations.56

The Refugee Act of 1980 provided a new approach to refugee policy, giving both
Congress and the executive branch some control over the admissions process. The
executive branch needed flexibility to conduct foreign policy, while Congress (in theory,
at least) regained control over refugee policy and numerical limits." The Act created a
new definition of ''refugee" to reflect a changed admissions

It also afforded a

new admission system that allowed for both flexibility and usable standards through
systematic consultations between Congress and the executive branch.59
The intent of Refugee Act of 1980 was to repeal the ideological and geographic
definition of refhgee and bring the focus more in line with humanitarian concerns. The
Act also repealed the old, numerically limited, seventh preference. It had become
apparent that a single fixed ceiling, applicable every year, simply wouid not fit the
fluctuating needs created the by the ebb and flow of refugees. When drafting the Refugee

Act, Congress did not want to leave refugee admissions totally numerically unregulated
nor did it want to treat refugee admissions in the same way .as immediate relatives and
special immigrants, which are governed only by qualitative and not numerical criteria. "

The Refugee Act therefore established a third broad admission structure that is governed
Bockley, supra note 23, at 279.
Id
57 Tyson, supra note 15, at 924.
58 Id. at 923. The United States now defines a refugee as "any person who is outside of any country of such
person's nationality ... and who is unwilling or unable.toreturn to, and is unable or unwilliilg to avail
himself or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
o inion." Pub. L. No. 96-212, amending M A §.207,8U.S.C.A.$ 1157.
"Id See Tyson. supra note 1 5, at 923.
55

56

by a system different from both quota immigration and the numerically unlimited system
for immediate re~atives.~'

The passage of the 1980 Refugee Act and the adoption of the new definition of a
refugee went a long way to de-politicize asylum, but it would be almost impossible to
completely remove political implications from the Overseas Refugee Program. First,
recognizing that a rehgee's home country has treated, or is .likely to treat, its own
citizens in an unfair and improper manner is an explicit political value
However, perhaps a distinction can be made between this inherent political side of
rehgee admissions and a policy which explicitly limits refugee admissions to those
fleeing the Eastern Bloc. Secondly, even if foreign policy considerations were deemphasized because of present international conditions, foreign policy decision-makers
would probably be reluctant to accept any reduction in their ability to influence refugee
policy.
Due to a natural reiuctance to relinquish power or influence once gained, policy
rnalcers have a vested interest in maintaining a certain degree of relevance for foreign
policy consideration. Moreover, executive agencies have gained an expanded role by the
ability to respond more quickly than Congress to formulate policy in politically sensitive
refugee ''crises" such as the Mariel boatlift and the Hatian influx.63 Thus, the question is
how can the process be changed in order to make foreign policy considerations secondary
to humanitarian concerns. In spite of the Congress's attempt to answer this question, the
Overseas Refugee Program is primarily driven by foreign policy objectives.

Aleinikoff, supra note 7, at 738.
739.
Cooper, supra note 25, at 945.
Id.

6' Id.
62

11. AN OVERVIEW OF THE OVERSEAS REFUGEE PROGRAM

A. Qualification

The process by which the executive branch and Congress make determinations
regarding the admission of refugees from outside the United States is set forth in TNA $

207,8 U.S.C.

1 157. Under this statute, the President, after consutting with Congress,

sets the maximum number of refugees who may be admitted to the United States during
each fiscal year. The President also allocates the total among various countries or world
regions. Ceilings are set within each region, for those who are of special humanitarian
concern or whose admission is in the national interest.&
Decisions on qualiQing countries and regional numerical ceiling are largely
shaped by recommendations Born the State Depamnent which are greatly influenced by
political considerati~ns.~~
For example some groups may be refused based on a judgment,
that conditions may soon settle down in the home country allowing voluntary
repatriation, or that local settlement in the first asylum country is preferable to distant
resettlement, or that this group has sufficient opportunities to resettle in distant lands
other than the United States, even though they meet the dekition of a refugee as set out
in INA 4 10l(a)(42).~~
Within the Department of State, the Bureau of Population, Refugees and

Migration prepares an annual consultation document containing specific proposals for the
upcoming fiscal year - ceilings for each region, national groups of special concern,

processing categories for each nationd group -plus a justification for each aspect of the
WA $6 I01(a)(42), 207(a)(3).
Cooper, supra note 25, at 945.

overall U.S. refugee program. The President then reviews the document and consults
with congressional committees. The executive branch administers the findized program.

Throughout this process, an administration is relatively fiee to insert its foreign policy
goals into refugee
Ceilings are important, because the number accepted for resettlement usually falls
short ofthe ceiling figure and there is no carry-over of numbers from one year to the
next.68 Independent of these ceilings, the President may admit additional refbgees on an
"emergency basis."69 Before making this determination, however, the President must
engage in "appropriate consultation," which must include personal discussion between
members of congressional committees and Cabinet-level representative^.^^ As a result of
the allocations, not all are to be considered equally eligible to migrate to the United
States. More precise criteria for selection and priorities are included in the annual
consultation documents submitted to Congress, and in guidelines issued to field
officers.'
Under current guidelines, the first priority is reserved for those in immediate
danger of loss of life and certain others such as political prisoners or dissidents. However,
this provision is extremely narrow and is applied in exceptional individual cases 01ll~.'~
Only a tiny fraction of annual adrmssions fall within this category. 73 Almost all refugees
66 Aleinik~ff~
supra note '7,at 739.
6 7 ~ dat. 197.
68 Peter H. Koehn, Refigeafiorn Revolution: US.Policy and Third-World Migration 206 (1991).Between
1980 and 1982, the DlS approved the resettlement of424,OOOrefugees. Id After this initial influx, annual
refugee admission averaged around 65,000 per year. Id. For fiscal year 1998, the President authorized a
ceiling of 83,000refhgees admitted for permanent resettlement in the United States. Bureau of Population,
supra note 2.
69 8 U.S.C. 5 1101(a)(42)(B).
70

Id

AleinLoff, supra note 7, at 739.
Id.
73
Tyson,supra note 15, at 927.
'I

72

admitted into the United States fall into other preference categories based primarily on
family ties and previous politicd ties to the United ~tates.'~
The next four priority groups

all require some kind of earlier tie to the United States, by family, education, or
employment. The finalpriority, known as P-6, potentially covers all others found to meet
the refugee d e f ~ t i o n .In most regions of the world, P-6 processing is unavailable;. only
the frrst five priorities (sometimes only the first four) are considered to be eligible for the

U .S. refugee program.75
Within the executive branch, the Department of State makes nearly all of the
important decisions on rehgee

admission^.'^ It should be noted, however, that to qualify

as a refugee is not to qualify for admission to the United States as a refugee. From
among the miliions of refugees ,worldwide, the Rehgee Act requires the executive
branch, in consultation with Congress, to designate groups "of special humanitarian
concern to the United ~tates"" or whose admissions as refugees is in the U.S. nationaI
interest?' Once a region of the world receives one of these designations, individuals

within that region must first estabIish a welI-founded fear of persecution.79 Next, they
must fit into a preference category.80Thus,refugee designations continue to be made for
political reasons.

Tyson, supia note 15, at 927.
Id.
76 Western Hemisphere Immigration and United Stoles Foreign Policy, supra note 22, at 196.
Iraqi rehgees received this designation in 1991.
78 Nuclear scientists are one example. Supporters of democracy fleeing totalitarian governments, such as
China, are another.
8 U,S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
Assignment of an individual to a particular processing priority does not reflect any judgement as to
whether that individual ultimately will qualify for admission to the U.S.as a refugee, although it reflects an
assessment of the urgency of the need for resettlement. Office of Admissions, Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for Fiscal Year 1998 (April 1998)
<http:~/www.state.go~/www/globa1/pdrpt~9804~rehgee~adm.hrm1>.
Just as qualifying for refugee
status does not confer a right to resettlement in the United States, assignment to a particular preference
category does not entitle a person to admission to the United States as a refugee. Id.
74
75

"
"

I7

On site, at the processing ofices or at U.S. embassies around the world, eligibility

for refugee status is decided on a case-by-case basis.81 Immigration and Naturalization
Service Officers conduct personal interviews of all applicants.82
Under the 1980 Refugee Act, U.S. law defines a "refugee" in a manner
conforming to the United Nations d e f ~ t j ~ Yet
n . the
~ ~U.S. definition does not
distinguish refugees corn a ~ ~ l e eLegal
s . ~ challenges
~
and political pressure forced the
INS to adopt different standards in admitting refugees from overseas than it did when

ruling on asylum petitions submitted by persons already in the United

People

appIying for refugee status through the Overseas Refugee Program are not required to
meet the same stringent evidence and documentation requirements as asylum applicants.
Oficers conducting overseas interviews frequently apply standardized group profiles;
they do not expect concret,edocumentation of personal persecution or insist upon
corroborative evidence because it would be considered "unfair" to do so.86 Generally, if
the applicant's own statements are credible and consistent with the interviewer's

knowledge of conditions in the sending country, such statements are usually accepted as

81

Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, US,Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Program
(July 1998) <http://www.state.gov/~~~/globaYpnn/fs~re~gee~a~~3807.hml~.
82 Id.
83
See 8 U.S.C.5 1 IOl(a)(42); art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
84 Practically, refugees are of course, different from other immigrants in important ways. By definition,
they face higher than usual risks of serious ham. They are unable to turn to their own governments for
protection. And they are more likely to have been emotionally traumatized.
Koehn, supra note 67,at214. Unlike a refugee, who is simply "outside his or her country of
nationality," an asylee is an alien "in the United States or at a port of entry" and like a refugee, unable or
mwilJing to return because of a weltfounded fear of persecution. AsyIees are a special.class of refugees individuals who have already reached the U.S. border. Applicants for asylum must meet the same
requirements as refugees but there is no numerical ceiling on the admissions of asylees, and asylees need
not fit into the "of special humanitarian concern to the United States" classification. All an asylee must do
is present himself or herself u, immigrations authorities in the United States or at an U.S. port of entry and
request asylum. Of course this means that m asylee my enter the United States either legally or illegally
and claim asylum. Id.
8b Id.

"
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sufficient proof of persecution.87 If this standard is met, refbgee status is granted. The
rehgee prepares for resettlement in the United States.

B. Resettlement
The present resettlement system developed from the Corporate Affidavit Program
of 1946.88The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 continued to use the same system, which
was expanded during the Hungarian Refugee ~ r o ~ r a mThe
. * ~Cuban and Indochinese

Refugee Programs fvmly established the current system.g0This system has two phases:
1) preparation for resettlement while in the country of first asylum; and 2) adjustment
within the United States.

Before refugees actually enter the United States, they receive preparation in a
variety of areas. The oEcial position of the State Department on preparation for

resettlement is to "ensue that, refugees who are accepted for admission to the United
States are prepared for the significant changes they will experience during

resett~ement."~' Voluntary Agencies and the Bureau for Population, Refugees and

Migration provide pre-departure language classes, cultural orientation training and
provides each rehgee with a copy of Welcome to the United States, a resettlement
handbook written by refigee resettlement workers and resettled refugees in conjunction
with federal and state government 6fficial~?~
This book is produced in a number of
87

Id. 'TheCommission of Immigration and Refugee Policy found that "a person who belongs to a goup
qualified forreEugee status is accorded a strong presumption of eligibility ..., and is primarily examined to
ensure only the helshe is not excludable from the United States." Zucker, supra note 43, at 153.
ld*at 103.
89 Id.
90
91

Id.

Refugee Admissions Report, P W 1998 (visited Nov. 14, 1998)
<http//www.state.gov/www/globaYpdrpt~9804-refirgea.html>.
92 Welcome to the United States: A Guidebookfor Refigem (Cenrer for Applied Linguistics Refugee
Service Center ed., 1st ed. 1996).

languages and is supposed to give refugees access to basic information about resettlement
before they arrive.93 Refugees also receive medical examinations, attend problem solving workshops, and otherwise prepare for departure to the United states."
Typically those who gain admission through the Overseas Refugee Program are
located in a rehgee camp in a foreign country at the time of their selection, but with
increasing frequency they are selected and processed while still within their countries of

In resettlement, the top priority of the United States government is to promote
economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible, limiting the need for public assistance.96
To facilitate this goal, each refugee case is assigned to an American private voluntary
agency." While a refugee is still overseas, infomation that has been gathered about
himher is sent to New York City, where the American Council for Voluntary
International Action, an umbrella organization of the voluntary agencies, uses State
Department fvnding to run a Refugee Data Center. At the Data Center, the refugee is
assigned to a voluntary agency sponsor. This agency decides where to locate the refugee.
Initial placement is determined by a number of factors: location of family, cosponsorships, housing, or job availability.9g

"

While the book contains good information about American culture, it may be inadequate for a modem
urban existence. For example under "Finding a Job," the book advises "lelven if you speak little or no
English, a smiling face and eagerness to work will help a great deal. Id at 39.
94
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, supra note 79. These "other" preparations include the
purchase of travel documents. Transportation arrangements to h e United States are usually made through
the InternationaI Organization for Migration. Bureau of Population, supra note 2. Each refugee signs a
note, promising repayment of the cost of airfare. Id.
95 Orderly Departure Frogram established in 1979 allowed processing of cases while the applicants remain
in their home countries. Applicants fkom Cuba, fomer Soviet Union and Vietnam may apply f?om their
country of origin. This program can be established only in special circumstances when the home country
a ees.
4 u r e a u of Population, Refugees, and Migration, supra note 79.
97

id.

98

Zucker, supra note 43, at 11 1.
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The Voluntary Agencies work under a cooperative agreement with Department of
State, provide sponsorship and initial resettlement assistance, including housing, essential
furnishings, food and other basic needs, clothing, and additional cultural and community
~rientation.~~
Voluntary Agencies are central to resettlement. Their services range from
governmental and quasi-govemental fuxlctions to purely private aid activities. 1t links
the refugee to the various public and private bureaucracie~.'~~
In addition to programs sponsored and administered by the voluntary agencies the
refbgee also has access to programs funded by the Department of Health and Human
Services and administered by each State. These programs provide money, medical
assistance, training programs, and other support services to assist rehgees to make the
adjustment to life in the United states."'
After one year in the United States, a refugee is eligible to adjust status to ''lawful

permanent resident."lo2 After five years of residency, refugees are eligible to apply for

Newly aniving refugees are admitted by the INS at a U.S. port of entry
and given authorization for employment. Io4 They are also immediately eligible

for special .resettlementand adjustment assistance in addition to a11 normal public
assistance benefits.los Statistics show that during the first year of admission,
about 75 percent of refugees are on public assistance; after their second year in
the United States, more than half are still on public assistance, and even after
1d
Zucker, supra note 43, at 12 1 .
Id. Voluntary agencies actually go beyond being the refugee's sponsor, they are also play a part in
formulating refitgee policy.
'02 MA 9 209(a)(I), 8 U.S.C.A. !J 1159. SeeBureau oCPopulation, supra note 2.
'03 MA 5 316(a), 8 U.S.C.A. 9 1427. See Zucker, supra note 43, at 103.
lW
M A 8 208(4(2), 8 U.S.C.A. $1 158. See Bureau of Population, supra note 2.
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loo
lo'

three years in the United States, roughly one third collect welfare.lo6 In
California, the state with the highest welfare benefits, these percentages are even
higher. Eighty-five percent of refugees in California who had been in the United
States for less than three years were on public assistance.'ol

However, the good

news is that once refugees stabilize, they do climb the ladder of economic
progress. In states such as California which hosts a large refugee population, a
drain may be created on resources. If properly administered, there is no doubt
that domestic rehgee resettlement has a price attendant to it.''*

The services needed to make refugees fully participative in society include
the ability to take m arrival situation of a refugee that normally has ...
limited education, usually in a language other than our own, and the
acquisition of employment skills that do not fit in our market.
Services for language, employability, and acculturation for a long
enough duration to give the refugees a reasonable chance to participate are
key to a resettlement effort.

....
...We don't believe that the realities of refugee resettlement have
grown simpler since the Refugee Act of 1990 [sic]. If anything, they are
more complex, particularly given the economy nationally and in
California. Self-sufficient is no easier to accomplish than it was then,
been long Iost since 1980.1J

C. A Case Study: The Rafah Refugee Program

A recent example of a refugee group resettled using the Overseas Rehgee
Program (ORP) is the Rafha Refugee Program. This involved the permanent resettlement

5

5

'05 TNA 412 , s U.S.C.A. 1 522.
Io6 I&!
'ol Id Tnis statistic is for 1984.
Io8 Zucker, supra note 43, at 130.

See Immigration: Debating the Issues 177 (Nicholas Capaldi ed ., f 997).

"

RReJirgeeAdmissions Program for Fiscal Year 1994: Hearing on Refigee Admissions Program Before
the Subcom. on In! 'I Law. Immigration, and Refigees of the House of Representatives Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 16,82 (1993) (statement o f Bruce A. Kennedy, Bureau Chief, California Refugee
and Immigration Program Bureau).
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of Iraqi refugees who participated in the uprising against Saddam Hussein at the end of
the Gulf War, and who were interred in Rafha Camp in Saudi Arabia.
At the direction of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on August 2,

1990."~ On January 17, 1991, Coalition forces including the United States began a
bombing campaign on lraq.lH A ground attack in Kuwait and Iraq f o l l o ~ e d . " ~

Encouraged by President George Bush, Iraqis, primarily in the South, took up arms
against Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi government on March 2,1991 ."3 The uprising
ultimately failed, and the anti-government rebels fled.
Nearly two million Iraqis fled the fighting during the Gulf War. Although most
returned at the end of the war, significant numbers remained in countries of first asylum,
fearing persecution in Iraq. Approximately 39,000 people - inciuding military deserters,
ethnic and religious minorities, and those who participated in the uprising against the
Iraqi regime - remained in refugee camps in Saudi Arabia from 1991 to 1 997.'14 The
United States participated in a multi-country resettlement effort let by the UNHCR for

Iraqi refugees in the Rafha c m p in Saudi Arabia. The effort resulted in third-country
resettlement of 24,260 refugees; 12,200 came to the United States."'
How refugees are received in their country of first asylum depends on that
country's current policy toward refugees."6 In the case of the Iraqis, Saudi Arabia is not

a signatory to either the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the status of Rehgees or the
1967 Protocol. It has maintained a policy of keeping the Rafha camp "closed" and travel
Joint Voluntary Agency, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Quarterly Program Report, appendix (December 3 1 ,
1996) (timeline of Iraqi refugee movement to Saudi Arabia).
Id.
112.
Id. The gtound attack lasted from February 23,199 1 to February 28, 199 1.
'I0

~d.
I"1d.
113

'I5

U.S.Committee for Refugees, World Refuge Survq 1998 154 (1998).

outside its boundaries is forbidden for the refugees. A curfew of 24.00 is strictly
enforced. As rehgees are resettled and.houses are vacated within the camp, the Saudi
camp authorities have promoted consolidation of camp housing and the demolition of
vacant structures and unused areas of the camp. Large areas of housing are razed and

occupants are continuously .moved into other areas. Services to the camp are under
control of the Saudi Military authorities. Food provisions and distribution is controlled by

''

the Saudi military through local contra~tors.~ The Saudrs have repeatedly"8 voiced
their unwillingness to allow immigrants or rehgees to resettle in their country, but have
agreed to keep the camp open for as long as necessary.

Fortunately, for the refbgees who remain in the Ratha Camp, Saudi Arabia and
Iraq continue to be designated as areas of "humanitarian concern". Even though the
resettlement program has officially ended, some of these refugees still have the
possibility to enter the United States on refugee status. This is not true for many others
around the world who are not so fortunate to be in areas so designated. Udortunately,
until U.S. immigration and refugee policy and the influences attendant to it are refocused

many desperate pleas may go unheeded.

111. KEY INFLUENCES O N U.S. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

United States refugee policy is the product of compromise between competing
factors: humanitarian concerns, domestic concerns including special interest groups and

I I6
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Zucker, supra note 43, at 98.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, supra note 109, at appendix.
ld

public opinion, and foreign policy."y Each factor has its own influence, and varies in
strength and dominance over time, but they all interact to shape refugee policy.'2u

In the public mind, United States rehgee policy is often associated with altruism
and compassion. The common assumption is that the refugee program is meant to
alleviate the suffering of fellow human beings that have been forced from their
homelands as well as upholding human rights.'*' However, neither a humanitarian model
nor a human rights model adequately explains how refugee policy is actually developed.
Often, domestic concerns and foreign policy goals shift the focus away from
humanitarian principles. 122

A. Humanitarian Concerns
Logically, it seems that humanitarian concerns should be the highest priority

when developing rehgee policy if the goal of the Rehgee Act of 1980 is to be
accomplished and the integrity of international law is to be maintained. However, this
logic is not often used. Of the various concerns that the Act addresses, intent to ensure
the humanitarian approach has the weakest support.'23 Foreign policy and domestic
concerns have most often taken precedence over humanitarian goals. Maybe the question
should be asked as to whether the United States has a moral obligation to put
humanitarian concerns at the highest priority considering it is a nation built by refugees.

There is also a question as to whether Congress has a compelling reason to insure that
this goal is met.
When Congress drafted the Refugee Act of 1980, it provided that a person must
Tyson, supra note IS, at 929.
Id
12' Id.
'22 Id.
'I9
IZ0

meet the refugee definition and come from a region or country of "special humanitarian
concern" as requirement for resettlement to the United States. However, Congress
provided no definition of "'humanitarian." Nevertheless, even without a statutory
definition, Congress insisted that the concept of humanitarian concern be an essential
element of the new refugee

Congress's humanitarian intent is implicit in the

choice of language to describe the standard for determining admissions allocations.
Based on legislative history and in order to insure against unwarranted executive
discretion to apply politicaIly motivated selection criteria, Congress persisted with the
"special humanitarian concern"

In spite of congressional intent, conflicting interpretations of a political situation
illustrates how humanitarian goals can conflict with politics. For instance, the President
consults the State Department regarding global refugee status before he submits his
Determination on the Annual Refugee Admission Program. Approaching the same
refugee situation, the State Department may base its evaluation of the refugee status on
the political aspect of the particular situation. Whereas, Amnesty International may stress
the pattern of human rights violations in the country of origin and the plight of the
refugees. However, the State Department is the major source of decision-making
authority for refugee policy, thereby defeating the humanitarian intent of the statute.

B. Domestic Concerns
The domestic policy considerations that motivated proposals for numerical limits
continue to be significant. For most of the 1980's, immigration policy in general has

lU

id.
Id. at 926.
Id.

been marked by an increasing emphasis on stemming illegal entry.'26 Additional
domestic political pressure against new entrants has come as a reaction to the various
waves of asylum and refuge seekers, and the public perception of "borders out of
control," and the trend to shift the cost of resettlement from the federal government to the
states. At the same time, congressional demands for much greater admissions of
particular groups have resulted in an overall increase in refugee admissions since 1986.12'
1. Special Interest Groups

In addition to the m u a l Presidentid Determination, some "privately funded
admissions" may be approved. This approach was first used in the Determination for
1987, as a partial response to the federal budget squeeze. It enables private groups to

secure admission for certain individuals by pledging to provide the services usually
provided by the federal government. 12'
Special interest group exploitation of the refugee program has exacerbated an
already existing domestic resistance to newcomers. Such resistance hurts mostly those
refugees who are of humanitarian concern but have no political or family ties. Inevitably,
they will be the first ones to be denied admission in order to satisfy the desire for

numerical limits, while those with more influence continue to be admitted. Lobbying by
private interest groups recently pushed legislators for increased admissions of specific
religious and ethnic groups. 'Ig Soviet ethnic and religious groups protested the loss of
presumptive eligibility for refugee status because they were unsatisfied with parole status,
'26

id. at 925.
Id. at 926.

The fmt use of these provisions came in 1988 when ,684 Cubans entered under the sponsorship of the
Cuban American National Foundation. Refugee Reports, Oct. 14, 1988 at 8.
lza

which lacks resettlement:benefits and other privileges. As a result of their efforts,
President Bush signed the Lautenberg Amendment which made it easier for certain
groups fmm the former Soviet Union and Indochina to enter the United States. The
standard of proof of refugee status for these groups is only to assert a fear of persecution
and show a "credible basis for concern about the possibility of such persecution."'3o

Some groups have the ability because of political influence to obtain a special interest
admission category beyond yearly ceilings which would entitle them to resettlement
funds. This could be characterized as preferential and unfair.13'

This use of parole is not only significant as a failwe to fujfill the Act's mandate to
create an orderly, systematic program for the admission of refugees, but may also be a
cause of negative domestic reaction against the refugee program.
2. Pubtic Opinion

Public opinion is another important influence on refugee policy. Immigration
poIicy frequently becomes a matter of public controversy and often takes center stage in
United States political debates. Cultural biases occur when refugees are not adequately
prepared to enter American society. Whereas in the past, refugees h r n Eastern Europe
were similar to Americans in appearance and culture, the recent iuflux of refugees from
Asia, the Middle East and Africa presents a more complex problem. More must be done
to promote the "confluence in cultures" so as not to create a "clash of cultures."'32 These

15, at 928 (particularly Soviet Jews and Evangelicals, Czechs, and Poles). In 1989
the INS dropped its longstanding presumption of eligibility for refugee status for all Soviet and certain
lZ9nson, supra note

Vietnamese applicants.
Id. at 930.
13' Id at 936.
'32 Id. at 248.

clashes have occurred across the country.'33 As refugees compete for community aid
services, low-income housing, jobs and scarce resources, they are pitted against longresident Americans, particularly those who are economically marginal and/or socially
disadvantaged.134 This competition sometimes creates public backlash against refugees

and immigrants.135As Wayne Cornelius suggested in 1977, YsJomething quite
predictable happens in the U.S, every time the economy goes through d i f f ~ c uillegal
l~
workers are rediscovered." Politicians, journalists, organized labor and the American
public rush,to blame them for all the possible or imaginary problems that may exist in
American ~ 0 c i e t y . lThis
~ ~ attitude extends to refugees as well as illegal or undocumented

immigrants. The American public does not differentiate between immigrants,
undocumented aliens and refugees. '37
Throughout history the United States was seen by the public as a nation thal
selects its refugees carefully. The United States was rarely a place of first refuge.13'
However, in recent years, the situation has changed. The increasing numbers of refugees
coming directly to the United States has created the perception in the general public that
the United States has.lost control of its borders.'39
The most visible proof of this fact was seen in the 1980 Mariel Boat Lift. More

than 130,000 Cuban refugees arrived in the United States within a five-month period

133 Zucker, supra note 43, at 1 13 (refugees have been accused of everything from taking over fishing rights
to stealing and eating pets, poaching in public parks, living in such numbers as to create health hazards,
receiving favorable treatment at the expense of local residents and undercutting labor markets),
134 Id.
13' WesternHemisphere Immigration and United Srates Foreign Policy, supra note 22, at 248.
136
Id (quoting Wayne A. Cornelius, Undocumenredimmigration:A Critique of rhe Carter Administration
Policy Proposals, Migration Today 5:4 (October 1977)).
'37 Zucker, supra note 43, at 1 13.
138 Id.
139
The population of illegal aliens is growing by as much as 500,000each year, Giuliani, The Immigration
program of the Reagan Administration, 36 U . Miami L.Rev. 807 ( 198 1-82).
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shattering the illusion that the United States could control its borders.ldO

Negative

publicity concerning the large number of refugees, the rumors that Castro had opened his
jail and insane asylums in order to foist unwanted Cubans onto the United States, and

lurid accounts of criminal conduct in the detention centers in the United States soured the
American public's attitude toward future immigration and refugee policy.

141

Another example is the Vietnamese refbgees who were seen as taking jobs from
American workers and education resources from American children. ld2 In 1975, reports
indicated that the majority of Americans were opposed to the admission of Vietnamese
refugees. The Vietnamese refugees were perceived as potential competitors for jobs and
federal aid programs.143
A third and more recent example is where Iraqi refugees were seen as enemies of

the State. In 1993, 100 congressional Representatives, prompted by their constituents,

calling to stop the resettlement of Iraqi refugees from Saudi Arabia sent a letter to
President Clinton. The question was whether the military deserters among the refugees at
Rafha had actively participated in aggression against United States soldiers during the

~ u l war.'"
f
Congress and the American people were assured that no one is resettled in
the United States without .demonstratinga well-founded fear of persecution and that the

Iraqi deserters actively opposed the regime and had fought to overthrow Saddam in
March of 1991

The letter suggested that the refugees in the Rafha camp were actua1,ly
-.

Cort, supra note 47, at 323.
Id.
j4' Id.
Bockley, supra note 23, at 276.
lu4
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, supra note 109, at appendix. Submitted by Immigration and Refugee
Services of America.
145
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Law, lrnmigration, and Rehgees of the Committee
on the Judiciary House of Representatives, Serial No. 16 September 23, 1993, U.S. Government Printing
the issue, Department of State in a Statement to the Subcommittee.
'jO

prisoners of war and that the resettlement program should be stopped."
Haitians and Salvadorans were seen as economic migrants and possible wards

of the State. The Haitian refugee crisis of 1982 demonstrates that despite professed
sponsorship of international human rights norms, nations react to strong internal
pressures in the .formsof domestic politics, interest and lobby groups, and budgetary

considerations. Each of these internal pressures frequently operates to the detriment of

humanitarian principles.'47
"Compassion Fatigue" is a notion put forward by Senator Simpson.I4*His notion
assumes that the primary obligation of the Refugee Act is to serve a narrowly conceived
"national interest and that compassion must be bridled, otherwise the American people

will eventually become unwilling to extend compassionate refuge.I4'

So called

"compassion fatigue" of many nations toward refugees has been contagious, causing
other nations to change their immigration policies along more restrictionist lines.I5'
For example in 1992, the Bundesrat amended the German Constitution to reiterate
the right of refugees to asylum in Germany, but the amendment further specified the right
did not apply to individuals arriving fiom countries that did not engage in political
persecution. Since most asylum-seekers were travelling through supposedly "safe"
countries, they could not meet the definition as interpreted by the new amendment.151
Canada recently incorporated aImost identical changes in its Immigration Act which
provides that immigration from "prescribed" countries involves a presumption of
Id.

Con,supra note 47, at 323.
I4'zucker, supra note 43, at 174 (Senator Alan K. Simpson was co-sponsor of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill,
which sought to eliminate due process rights for aliens.)
'I4'

'49

Tyson, supra note 15, at 93 1.
supra note 47, at 325.
Id. at 324.

150 Cort,

"'

freedom fiom persecution.'52 England and France have dso passed legislation restricting
the ability of asylum seekers to enter their countries. Thus, the "compas$ion fatigue" of
the 1990s, which was probably braught about by the economic and social burden of
refugee maintenance in receiving nations, has caused many countries to enact domestic
legal restrictions on the humanitarian-based international refugee norms.'53 This
resurgence of restrictionist policy is a pessimistic sign for the future of refugee
protection. '54

C. Foreign Policy
The 1980 Refugee Act changed the U.S. government's oficially recognized
defmition of a refugee by removing the reference in earlier legislation to flight fiom "any
Communist or Communist-dominated country or area" and replacing it with the
internationally accepted standard of "persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a ,particularsocial group, or political
opinion."'55 1n spite of this change, the humanitarian focus remains subordinate to
ideological and foreign-policy calculations.'56 Since 1980, the Executive Branch has

often proposed or carried out refugee policy designed to embarrass or weaken
governments seen as hostile to the United States, to stabilize those seen as not politically
radical but dangerously weak, and to bolster regimes aligned with U,S. foreign

For the most part, this tactic has been directed at Communist governments.'58 However,

Id. at 324.
Id.
Id. at 325.
IS5 8 U.S.C. 8 1 10 1(a)(42). See Koehn, supra note 67, at 207.
IS6 Id.
157
WesternHemisphere immigration and UnitedStates Foreign Policy, supra note 22, at 23.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and Cuba, for example.
32
"2

'"

the end of the Cold War has not necessarily ended the practice.159Refugees continue to
be used as political tools to achieve policy objectives.16'
As a result, individuals with equally convincing or more compelling cases for

resettlement who are fleeing from non-communist countries and from repressive regimes
that the State Department considers friendly to the United States have not secured
equitable access to the refugee-admission program.

Examples of this disparity include

persons who have fled persecution in Chile during General Pinochet's rule, South Africa,
South Korea, El Salvador, Haiti, and the Philippines under Ferdinand ~ a r c o s . In
'~~
addition, the Reagan and Bush administrations have consistently set disproportionately
low admission ceilings for refugees fiom Africa and Latin America. For example, in

1997, f i c a n refugees comprised approximately 35 per cent of the world's refugee
population and only 9 per cent of total refbgee admissions in fiscal year 1997 and for 8
percent of authorized fiscal year 1998 ad~nissions.'~~
Over the past decade, allocation numbers have favored refugees fiom Indochina,
the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. These areas supplied 80 percent of all refugees
admitted in FY 1 9 9 7 . ' ~As a consequence, bona fide refigees fiom other regions of the
world are precluded from consideration under the resettlement program. 16' In addition,

emigrants fiom the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Vietnam who do not satisfy the
definition of a refugee continue to be admitted under the attorney general's parole

Tyson, supm note 15, at 932,
Lraq is an example of the use of refugees as political tools after the end of the Cold War.
Koehn, supra note 67,at 207.
162 Id.
163
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population Refugees and Migration, U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program, (visited Nov. 14, 1998) ~http://www.state.gov/w/globa~pnn/fs~refugeefuadmdm9702.htm1~.
la4 Id.
165 Id.
lS9
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authority or under special legislation passed by Congress."I

Deciding on the privileged

few to admit as refugees remains an intensely political matter in the United States.
History has shown that the manipulation of refugee and immigration policy does

not work well as a foreign policy instrument for the United States.'67 It does not redly
undermine regimes Washington opposes, nor does it reliably bolster governments the
United States wishes to stabilize. Ironically, the use of d i g r a t i o n and refugee policy
may even hamper policy goals by placing impediments in the way of later bilateral
relations between the United States and sending nations.'68 Because of these drawbacks,

using refbgee policy as political armament against adversarial governments is a poor
tradeoff.

While refugee admissions implicitly discredit adversary governments as

persecutors, many other means are available to disparage adversary governments. What
this really means is that for the dispossessed refugee who is not of political importance or
who i s without a constituency in a third country, there is no alternative to compassionate
refuge extended by the United States or some other

Instead of considering only how refugee policy serves short-term foreign policy
goals, the Administration should also consider the possibility of how foreign policy
decisions create "refugee flows." The domestic impIications of such flaws include illegal
immigration, resettlement costs and political backlash against immigration and refugees.
International implications include instability in regions that will become long-term
foreign policy problems for the United States. Thus, policy decision-makers should
address the interrelationship between refbgee policy and foreign policy with long-term
In 1980 the Bush administration proposed legislation that would accord parolees the same privileges as
other permanent residents of the United States
'61 WesternHemisphere Immigration and United States Foreign Policy,supra note 22, at 293.
lb8 Id.

effects in mind.I7' In addition the use of immigration policy as a tool for foreign policy
quite often comes at a high price for individual migrants and for the United States as a
moral

These tactics treat population flows as little more than political

pawns which offends elementary notions of

IV. IMPACT OF THESE INFLUENCES O N THE CURRENT SYSTEM
More than any other area of law, our immigration policies define who we are as a
people and what qualities we admire and disdain in others.'74 Consequently, the
formulation of immigration policy requires value judgments about the optimal size of our
population, the composition of our society, and our general economic direction.I7'
The Refugee Act of 1980 established an overseas refugee admissions program
based on systematic consultation between Congress and the executive branch. This

policy, however, is subject to other competing influences; humanitarian concerns,
domestic concerns including special interest groups and public opinion, and foreign
policy concerns. Although many would argue that humanitarian concerns should be the
primary basis for United States refugee policy, it is often subsumed by the other
competing influences. This conflict has resulted in a discriminatory refugee policy in
which political interests define and supersede humanitarian concerns. United States
refugee policy should ensure that special interest and foreign policy concerns do not
swallow up humanitarian concern for the plight of refugees. Not even the best efforts of
Id.
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the United Nations and private international relief organizations can remedy the plight of
the .millions of global refugees when recipient nations close their borders or base
admission policy on political goals.'76
There is an inherent tension that runs through all political and legal decisionmaking on rehgee questions in the United States. The notion of refugee may initially
evoke public sympathy, but the possibility of resulting privileges, especially the potential
right to resettle indefinitely evokes suspicion that the unworthy are trying to claim that
status."7 This suspicion is compounded by the inherent vagueness and confusion that

results from competing interests that ultimately decide just who is a "refugee."
When privately funded groups are allowed to secure admission for certain
individuals, it allows wealthy groups to distort what should be public decisions on
refugee admission priorities and further slants admission in favor of groups with
important domestic constituencies and away from those having the greatest need.

In addition, U.S. foreign-policy actions rank among the most powerful "root
causes" of Third World refugee flows.178Foreign policy interventions create new
domestic immigration and political pressures. Two examples of these are Vietnam and

Cuba. In these instances, the United States Government proved unable or unwilling to
halt immigration due to the "inability to control the flow at its source.'79

In 1959, Fidel Castro established a communist government in Cuba. As a result
between 1959 and 1961, approximately 125,000 Cubans arrived in the United States.

This support for Cuban refugees was based largely on Cold War politics. The Kennedy

'"
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Administration used parole authority to admit hundreds of thousands of Cuban rehgees.
The United States pursued a generously passive policy with respect to processing of

Cuban claims for asylum, and as U.S. Cuban relations worsened the United States

consular office disregarded routine criminal checks for those applying for visas. The

U.S.government also provided more financial assistance programs to help establish
Cubans in the United States than it had to any other group ofrehgees.

180

In contrast, to the Cubans who were entering the United States at roughly the
same time, Haitian refugees seeking asylum in the United States worked against a
powerful presumption that they were NOT victims of perse~ution.'~'Of the estimated
thirty thousand refugees who entered the United States before 1980, it is estimated that
only 25

- 50 were granted asylum.'82 This resulted from the United States policy toward

the Duvalier govennment. The staggering difference in the numbers of Haitians and

Cubans admitted before 1980 dramatically reveals the impact of foreign policy on
immigration decisions.
Around 1964, in response to the brutality of the Duvalier regime, the black middle

class began to leave ~ a i t i . 'In~ the
~ next wave, many of the urban lower classes
departed.185These migrants were poor and unskilled, they arrived when the United
States had shifted toward immigration restrictionism and they sought to settle in a local

area that had a history of racism and little need for low-wage, unskilled workers.
Domestic forces impelled a distinct policy toward these new immigrants. The local elite
goaded the federal authorities into an unparalleled policy of rejection of Haitians. Their
Zucker, supra note 43, at ix.
lS1 Id,

justification was a need to control U.S.borders, but in effect the public felt that if the
Haitians were allowed to stay a precedent would be set that all poor, third world peoples
could claim a right to come and remain in the United States.
The United States' response to the refugee crisis created in Vietnam following the
fall of Saigon was far more generous than its Haitian counterpart. Like athers before
them the Vietnamese were also victims of global rivalries. President .Ford inherited the
Vietnam War fiom Richard Nixon and the United States was unprepared for the events
which quickly occurred after the disintegration of the Saigon government.i87 Following
the collapse of the non-communist Nguyen Van Theu regime in 1975, the United States
government became dedicated to a program to rescue its Vietnamese allies. The evacuees
were .to be ,admittedinto the United States under the parole provisions of the Indochinese
Refugee Act, and their numbers were set at a maximum of two-hundred thousand.
Guidelines h i t e d evacuation to United States employees and other Vietnamese whose
lives would be endangered by the Communist takeover. However, these guidelines were
not adhered to.Ig8 TOfacilitate their expedient evacuation, the Vietnamese refugee crisis
was characterized as a rescue operation. Almost 130,000 Vietnamese refugees were

airlifted out of Saigon prior to the Communist take over in April 1975.
When a humanitarian approach is not used to address rehgee poIicy, not only do
we defeat the intent of the Refugee .Act of 1980, we also disregard international law.

Ultimately, focusing on foreign policy may even create new refugees.
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V.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Stephen Legomsky argues that an independent board for overseas refigee
processing may be more neutral.'89 He envisions that this board would make annual
determinations of how many overseas rehgees the United States is to admit and which
classes of rehgees will comprise the pool, in essence, transfer the responsibiiity now held
by the Executive Branch to an independent body.

Under current law the fresident has the authority to make annual determinations

of how many refugees the United States will admit and the countries from which they are
to come. The main job of Legomsky's proposed Board wodd be to announce the total
annual refugee admission levels and choose among competing applicants based on

statutory guidelines provided by Congress. Legomsky further suggests that the Board
could specie geographic areas from which the refugees are to be drawn; it could prohibit
the use of geographic criteria altogether, or it could have the discretion whether to
employ geographic criteria. Under Legomsky's plan the Board would be accountable to
Congress and Congress should state explicitly 'Yhe principd goals are to ease the
suffering of refugees and to promote observance of human rights."lgO Legomsky's plan
would preserve the existing presidential power to admit additional refugees in the event
of an unforeseen emergency and should require the Board to make recommendations to
the president concerning the exercise of that power.19'
The main advantage of the proposed Board over the existing system of
presidential refugee selection is that an independent Board whose members enjoy fixed
Id. at 434.
Legomsky, supra note 5, at 676.
lWld. at 708.
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terms would be at least relatively removed from partisan and pressure group
influences.'92

The most forceful criticism of Legomsky's proposed Board is the lack of political
accountability. If the people did not elect the members, the members would not be
removable except by the president in extreme cases.'93

Davdene Cooper suggests that federal courts, which would determine the degree,

and kind of harm a foreign government inflicts upon its citizens, should make overseas
refugee determinations.'" Under this process judges would determine the kind of harm
that is illegitimate. One possible standard of a legitimate government action is an

exercise of power in the interest of its citizens and not in the interest of its leaders or a
small group of citizens. Judges would make the decisions based on the general condition
of the country and on the particular circumstances of the refbgee.I9' This approach could

accomplish the gods of the Refugee Act of 1980 and would lessen the role of the
Executive Branch in the refugee process.
It is conceivable, however, that both humanitarian and foreign policy goals could
be accommodated using the present system. If the executive branch would focus on

humanitarianprinciples when deciding refugee policy the humanitarian intent expressed
through the Refugee Act could be realized. To accomplish this policy-makers should
consider within the consultation process the impact of foreign policy decisions on refugee
flows.lg6This proposal simply expands the current requirement that decision-makers
assess the impact of refugee policy on foreign policy goals, to include an assessment of
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the impact of foreign policy decisions on refugee policy. If the executive branch
considers such information too sensitive to be made public, there are at least two options:
(1) create a liaison between the nationd Security Counc'il and the congressional

committees on refugee policy; or (2) form a special committee cornposed of executive
agency experts on foreign policy and national security issues and members of Congress

who sit on refugee policy cornrnittee~.'~~
These reforms would integrate the decisionmaking bodies in a way that would allow careful consideration of refugee
consequences. 198
In addition, perhaps the State Department should not be the only source of

information on international human rights and world refugee conditions submitted to
Congress as part of the consultation process. If considered at all they should be
considered in the context of their United States foreign policy perspective.

Such

information should come fiom independent agencies with expertise in those areas, such
as Amnesty International, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, voluntary agencies
that work in refugee camps, the Human Rights Watch Committees and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 200
The executive b m c h may not be the best decision-maker regarding United States
refugee policy. The present system of entrusting refhgee policy largely to the President

has a down side in regard to refugee determinations. In the first place there is an inherent
probability that a President will make foreign policy his first priority, which is what the
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American public expects.20'
In addition the State Department, which is instrumental in making refugee policy
decisions, has a central mission of effecting foreign policy.202 This approach inevitably
influences presidential refugee determinations on the basis of foreign policy. Ironically,
this approach not only excludes those in need of assistance, but can actually give rise to

refugee
In spite of these obvious drawbacks, ieaving the current system in place and
shifting the focus toward humanitarian criteria for refbgee selection is most likely the
most appropriate solution. The current system,, created and endorsed by the democratic
process, provides flexibility and the ability to respond to refugee crises that other
solutions may lack.
CONCLUSION
The above analysis indicates that in spite of U.S. efforts to conform with
international law and act with it best humanitarian intentions, it often acts in its own selfinterest with regard to its rehgee policy. This approach has not replaced the former adhoc parole admissions system, but has more or less encouraged the continued use of
executive branch group parole power.

The Refugee Act of 1980 cannot be legitimate unless it is based primarily upon a
compassionate humanitarian concern for the plight of refugees. Yet foreign policy and
domestic opinion continue to undermine the capacity of humanitarian concerns to
influence rekgee policy. In the future, if not addressed, domestic intolerance may
threaten refugee admissions. To preserve the goals of the I980 Refugee Act reforms
201
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must prevent the effects of foreign policy or public opinion to overwhelm the
humanitarian goal of the Act. A balance must be struck between the need to achieve

foreign policy goals and a continued commitment to help those who flee persecution,

If the United States wants to assume its international responsibility along with
other developed,western nations in addressing the current refugee crisis politicd agendas
must be de-emphasized and humanitarian principles should be the primary focus.
If the executive is to maintain a central role in determining refugee admissions

policy, the focus of selection must shift away from achievement of foreign policy goals
toward fuIfiIlrnent of humanitarian aspirations. Perhaps Congressional committees with
a more neutral agenda should take a more active role in the determination process. In

addition criteria for refugee designation should focus on humanitarian needs and less on
foreign policy goals. Input from experts in field of human rights and humanitarian aid
should have an active role in the refigee selection process.
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